True GOATs are strategic, not tactical

With the ascent of Jude Bellingham, we are finally marking the passing from one generation of Real Madrid to another. The outgoing vintage, though, was perhaps one of the most remarkable club side midfields we have ever witnessed: the pairing of Luka Modric and Tony Kroos, with the contribution of Casemiro, was the backbone of the Madridistas’ four European Cups between 2016-2021 (Modric won an additional one earlier in 2014). Arguably as impressive is their three La Liga titles over the same period, a competition which they have generally struggled to win compared to Barcelona.

Over the years, Madrid had plenty of other stars of course. Ronaldo and Bale at the Galactico level; Benzema, Marcelo and Sergio Ramos occupying ‘stalwart’ status, which probably underplays their importance; and the rise and fall of starlets like Isco and Asensio. But for all the debates about Ronaldo vs Messi (vs Bale if we want to be British about it, rather like considering Andy Murray part of a tennis ‘big four’), Modric and Kroos will in many managers’ eyes be the most imperative piece of the team.

Both are supremely talented and creative, which as deep-lying No 8s is their obvious role. Both are also superlative set-piece takers, too – Kroos’ last minute free-kick for Germany against Sweden in 2018 has been all-but-forgotten, but is surely one of the greatest ever in a World Cup. Likewise their ability to win, hold and carry the ball is also well-known. The phrase “press-resistant”, a favourite of contemporary analysts, is nowhere better characterised than by these two.

But it is really where these two skills – creative passing and escaping the press – combine that we see where true greatness lies. Because these two also have a side to them which few other ballon d’or candidates have: the desire to chase lost causes, to not give up, and to go the extra mile. And this is why the coaches’ opinions of the GOAT debate vary from many fans.

Below are two small (!) examples of what each of these do to give their team the edge, and it is on such actions that titles are built. Each example demonstrates specifically what Modric and Kroos – who are different players in many ways – contribute, and moreover do so on the biggest stage, in Clasicos and in European finals.

The first is from the 2022 Champions League final against Liverpool. With the game delicately poised at 0-0 and with Liverpool having arguably had the edge until that moment, Modric is fed something of a hospital pass from Casemiro of all people and, confronted by a three man Liverpool press, has to carry the ball right back to his own defence.

Real Madrid’s Decimaquarta

Yet he does not give it up or pass back to the keeper, or play for a foul. Instead, with a single swivel, Modric sends the ball through all three opponents to Carvajal and sets off the movement which sees Vinicius ultimately score the only goal of the match. Commentators did not really think of the goal coming as “out of nothing” since by the end of the move, it was a full Madrid attack. But in fact, looking at the provenance of it, it was pretty much something from nothing. Modric won that match with his indefatigability.

A few months later, Madrid are playing in a rather celebratory Clasico, which Los Blancos go on to ultimately win against Xavi’s early Barcelona side. The 3-1 scoreline, though, belies the fact that such matches are always tough, and always rely on moments; no moment is more important than the first goal.

Ancelotti vs Xavi

Up steps Tony Kroos on 11 minutes to harry through from defence to midfield and, as he is being physically bundled over by Busquets – indeed even as he is falling down on to the turf – sends a through-ball to Vinicius. This in turn leads to Benzema’s goal. Again, no official assist was racked up by Kroos for his effort, but his dogged pursuit of the best option overall (to send the pass), rather than the quickest option (to claim a foul) marks him out. He instinctively makes a long-term choice rather than a short-term one, and whilst Madrid went on to win handsomely, this opener set the tone.

Bear in mind that Modric and Kroos are already 36 and 31 years old respectively during the two highlights above. The reality is that both players show how the very best are strategic rather than tactical. Those who we believe see the ‘bigger picture’ around the pitch are those which will always be valued most by coaches. By comparison, Ronaldo for all his skills, could only ever be a tactical player rather than a strategic one; Messi’s slight edge in strategy is one of the reasons he is the better player in football history.

Madrid have the beginnings of a new platform now, and one which may see much success. But it will be a while before they can recreate a midfield of this quality, and in turn it will be a while before they, or anyone else, can come to dominate a competition like the European Cup the way they did. Players like Ronaldo and Bale still come up from time to time, as Bellingham shows; but players like Modric and Kroos are a much rarer breed.

Why Barcelona are still not learning their lesson

Messi sad

Ousmane Dembele has just arrived at Barcelona for a “club record fee” of €105m plus add-ons which could take the total paid to around €140m, far eclipsing even the official updated €86m paid for Neymar that the club had to admit to two years afterwards (although the real cost may still be somewhat higher, and we may never know). Whether Dembele can emulate his predecessor in footballing terms is anyone’s guess; but more intriguing is the fact that he may emulate the superstar as a future exit – curiously, Barcelona seem not to have learned their lesson and set a buyout clause of only €400m.

€400m may seem a lot, but this summer has shown that numbers we could barely believe have a habit of becoming reality; if TV revenues increase, the figure will not seem excessive. But in any case, and more importantly, it is already not very high in the world of preventative buyout clauses. If any proof be needed that Real Madrid are better run than Barça at the moment, it can be seen in the buyout clauses currently in place. Not only is Dembele’s price, their newest signing, still way below the sums set by their arch-rivals, but so are all the rest of the squad – by some distance, too. Eight of Real’s stars have clauses higher than Lionel Messi, the best player in the world. Suarez and Busquets look at snip at just €200m.

Real Barca transfers

Source: Gab Marcotti via ESPNFC.com, updated for Asensio, Isco and Dembele

Why have Barça been so remiss and what explains this imbalance? Well first, to be fair, the Barça squad is just that much worse than Real’s. Other than the MSN, most of the others have passed their Pique (lol) and their clauses were signed in another era. Having said that, Cristiano Ronaldo’s €1bn clause was set as long ago as 2015, a full year before Neymar (Barcelona’s youngest and most marketable star) was set at only €200m rising to €250m over three years. Is it perhaps that Barcelona do not have the pull to get players to agree to prohibitive buyout numbers? Or is the board still arrogant enough to believe that players go to Barcelona for its “philosophy”? Either way, it is a failing of their fiduciary duties which would be prosecutable under UK company law.

Furthermore, Barcelona really have encountered a perfect storm. The inflation in this year’s transfer window has hit them just as an irreplaceable star has gone. To be clear, buyout clauses work very differently from normal transfer fees in terms of distorting the market. This is because a normal fee is, these days, usually paid out over a number of years; so that a transfer fee of €222m might only be about €55m per year. The rest of the market (though not the idiot fans) will “know” that the extra money available to the club who has just sold their star asset is only €55m at that point. But with a buyout, the money arrives instantly, meaning that the market is aware of both an entire €222m overhang, as well as the necessity to frantically spend most of it on a replacement. Furthermore, buyout clauses are by their very nature “supernormal”, higher than market valuations. This means that in turn they are causing inflation above normal market values when the money is spent in turn. In other words, it is not just usual “football inflation” (see my previous) but a buyout-driven super inflation. Barcelona this summer have become a footballing version of Mansa Musa I.

Of course in today’s world, only a few clubs are true “buyers”: Real Madrid, who do so from their own resources, and then PSG and Man City, who do not. Barcelona have ultimately been left on the heap as just another “selling club”, the dreadful epithet that even Man Utd had to understand when they lost Ronaldo to Real all those years ago. Barça just have not learned their lesson.